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PROPERTY RIGHTS—WHEN REFORM IS NOT ENOUGH: A LOOK
INSIDE THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
REFORM ACT OF 20001
Imagine you own a million-dollar piece of property free and clear,
but then the federal government and local law enforcement agents
announce that they are going to take it from you, not compensate you
one dime, and then use the money they get from selling your land to
pad their budgets—all this even though you have never so much as
2
been accused of a crime, let alone convicted of one.

INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000 (hereinafter “Act” or “CAFRA”),3 it was seen as “a major step
toward reforming the federal forfeiture system.”4 However, it is
important to caution against such a general assertion in the face of the
ongoing abuses of civil forfeiture that have continued to plague innocent
property owners fourteen years after enactment of the Act.5 Civil
forfeiture allows the government to seize property that it suspects has
been involved in the facilitation of a crime and has long been intended
“to take the ‘offending property’ away from the malefactor, thereby
depriving the wrongdoer of his or her incentive and ability to commit
future crimes or other misdeeds.”6 While the Act was intended to
1. The author cautions that this Note provides examples of egregious abuse of the
practice of civil asset forfeiture, on which calls for reform are based. There are plenty of
legitimate exercises of civil asset forfeiture proceedings that law enforcement officials carry
out on a regular basis. See United States v. $159,880.00 in U.S. Currency, More or Less, 387
F. Supp. 2d 1000 (S.D. Iowa 2005); United States v. Six Thousand Two Hundred Seven
($6,207) Dollars in United States Currency, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (M.D. Ala. 2010).
2. United States v. 434 Main Street, Tewksbury, Mass. (The Motel Caswell) Federal &
Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to Take Family Motel from Innocent Owners, INST. FOR
JUST., http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture [hereinafter The Motel Caswell] (last
visited Mar. 10, 2015).
3. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012).
4. Steven L. Kessler, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, KESSLER ON
FORFEITURE, www.kessleronforfeiture.com/civil-asset-forfeiture-reform-act-of-2000/ (last
visited Mar. 10, 2015).
5. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken.
6. Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution
to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 241 (1994). See also Civil
59
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subject the ill-gotten gains of drug cartel members to forfeiture, its
ultimate effect has been to subject the property of everyday citizens to
civil asset forfeiture.7 Such forfeiture can occur even when the property
owners themselves have not been involved in any illegal activity.8
Take, for example, the story of the Caswell family, who owns the
Motel Caswell in Tewksbury, Massachusetts.9 The Caswells have
owned the motel for two generations and previously worked with
members of state and local law enforcement in an effort to prevent, and
in some cases report, crime that occurred on their property.10 With that
as a backdrop, imagine the Caswells’ surprise when they learned that
their local police department partnered with the Department of Justice to
seize and sell the Motel Caswell simply because a small percentage of
their guests had been arrested for drug-related crimes while staying on
their property.11 In reality, over the fourteen-year period in question,
there were more than one hundred and ninety-six thousand rooms rented
at the Motel Caswell, and only fifteen drug-related arrests were made.12
Why would the local law enforcement officials, with whom the
Caswells had worked with in the past, target and seize a locally owned
and run piece of property that had such a minimal connection to crime?
The answer seems to be purely profit driven.13 If the government were
Forfeiture the Grabbing Hand of the Law: How Prosecutors Seize the Assets of the Innocent,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/unitedstates/21588915-how-prosecutors-seize-assets-innocent-grabbing-hand-law (highlighting that,
“[i]n criminal cases, the government can confiscate assets only after a conviction. Under
‘civil forfeiture’, however, it can grab first and ask questions later. Property can be seized
merely on the suspicion that it has been involved in a crime.”).
7. See Stephen J. Dunn, Nothing Civil About Asset Forfeiture, FORBES, Feb. 18, 2013,
available at www.forbes.com/sites/stephendunn/2013/02/18/asset-forfeiture-is-anything-butcivil/.
8. See Id. (“[i]t is clear from the legislative history of CAFRA that Congress intended to
limit civil forfeitures to alleged structuring connected with an underlying offense of drug
trafficking or money laundering”).
9. The Motel Caswell, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (D. Mass. 2013); see also
Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse: Federal & Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to Take
Family Motel from Innocent Owners, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civilforfeiture-background (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (the number of arrests that the government
based their case upon represented less than .05 percent of the total rooms rented at the Motel
Caswell over the period of time in question).
13. Civil Forfeiture Abuse Case to be Argued Today before Federal Court in Boston,
INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture-release-2-13-2012 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2015) (quoting Larry Salzman, one of the Caswell’s attorneys, “[w]hat the
government is doing amounts to little more than a grab for what they saw as quick cash under
the guise of [civil] forfeiture”).

LEVESQUE.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

WHEN REFORM IS NOT ENOUGH

4/13/15 4:01 PM

61

to succeed in obtaining the Motel Caswell through civil forfeiture, the
Tewksbury Police Department would receive almost one million dollars
through their work with the Department of Justice.14 The police
department would obtain this revenue through the sale of the property,
while the rest of the profit would remain with the federal government.15
The Caswells, whose main source of income derived from the hotel
itself, had devoted their careers to owning and managing the motel.16
With the property’s seizure, they began to question how they would
afford the legal fight to retain their property.17 Unlike the case for most
property owners in similar situations, a public interest law firm that
specializes in fighting against the abuse of civil asset forfeiture
nationwide stepped in to aid the Caswells in their fight against the
forfeiture of their property.18 The Caswells were eventually successful
in their opposition to the forfeiture, as a federal judge found that law
enforcement had grossly exaggerated the evidence and ruled that the
property was not subject to forfeiture.19 While this victory was deemed
successful for the Caswell family, the real issues surrounding this case
plague innocent property owners across the nation.20 The simple fact is
that based on the minimal amount of evidence produced by state and
federal officials, the property should never have been subjected to
potential forfeiture in the first place.21
Another example of the abuse of civil forfeiture laws is the story of
Rochelle Bing, a forty-two-year-old grandmother who spends her time
working as a home health aide and as a babysitter for her
grandchildren.22 Bing purchased her home with the intention that it
14. Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse Federal & Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to
Take Family Motel from Innocent Owners, supra note 12.
15. Id. (“Civil forfeiture creates a perverse incentive for police to target innocent
owners and their assets rather than aiming for justice and public safety.”); see also George F.
Will, When Government is the Looter, WASH. POST, May 18, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-government-is-the-looter/2012/05/18/
gIQAUIKVZU_story.html.
16. The Motel Caswell, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. Id. See generally Stillman, supra note 5 (because the cost of litigation often far
exceeds the value of the property seized, those who have had their property wrongfully seized
through civil forfeiture are more likely not to pursue using the legal system as a remedy to
retain their property).
19. United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp .2d 298, 315 (D. Mass. 2013); see also
The Motel Caswell, supra note 2.
20. See Stillman, supra note 5.
21. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20.
22. Isaiah Thompson, Forfeiture Laws Ruin Lives, PROPUBLICA: JOURNALISM PUB.
INT. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/05/government_seizes_homes_of_the_
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would become a safe haven for her children and grandchildren if any one
of them were to fall upon tough times.23 Unfortunately for Bing, an
incident in October of 2009 derailed her plans.24 After one of her
children was caught selling crack cocaine to an undercover police
informant on Bing’s property on two occasions, police searched Bing’s
home.25 Bing was never charged with a crime and was not present at the
time of the encounter between her son and the police informant.26 Even
so, police sought to seize her home simply because it was the site of the
alleged drug deal.27 Bing was sent a letter informing her that she had
just thirty days to convince a judge to allow her to keep her home, and if
she was unable to do so she would be forced to vacate the premises.28
Bing was appalled by the injustice, and, unlike many property
owners in her situation, she sought to fight back against the forfeiture of
her home.29 She soon realized why such a large percentage of property
owners who have had their property seized through civil forfeiture
choose not to oppose the seizure when it became apparent that the fight
to retain her property would be long and expensive.30 Over the course of
the next two years, Bing’s attorney appeared in court on her behalf
twenty-three times before the prosecutor agreed to settle her case.31 In
the end, Bing was allowed to keep her home as long as she agreed to not
allow her son in the house when she was not present.32 Ironically, after
being dragged through court for two years and constantly faced with the
fear of losing her home, Bing said if she could do it again, she would
have consented to that agreement in the first place.33
Stories such as that of the Caswell family and Rochelle Bing are all
too common under civil forfeiture laws today.34 This Note addresses
innocent_under_forfeiture_laws_partner/.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Following the arrest of her son, no additional drugs were found during the
search of Bing’s home. However, unused packaging, suspected to be what the drugs were
placed in for sale, was found in a bedroom.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Fortunately for Bing, who was unable to afford legal counsel, her case was
referred to the legal clinic at the University of Pennsylvania, where she was represented by
law students free of charge.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Nick Sibilla, Florida Cops Made Millions Dealing Cocaine: The Latest
Asset Forfeiture Outrage, FORBES, Oct. 30, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/
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some of the lingering issues following the implementation of CAFRA35
and advocates for further reform.36 Many questions still remain about
the way enforcement of the Act is established and carried out, which is
contrary to Congress’ intent in implementing the Act.37
This Note examines the shortcomings of the CAFRA, highlighting
the injustices that innocent property owners are subjected to through the
practice of civil asset forfeiture.38 Specifically, this Note addresses the
problems under the Act with the preliminary burden of proof on the
government currently required to perform an initial seizure of property.
This Note also advocates for a change in the preliminary burden of proof
that would require the government to overcome a higher burden.
Section I traces the history of civil forfeiture laws in this country.
Specifically, this section addresses the evolution of attributing guilt to
the property itself along with the right of the government to acquire the
property through seizure. Furthermore, Section I discusses how the
system has now reached the point of requiring reform to civil asset
forfeiture laws.
Section II confronts the lingering questions that have resulted from
CAFRA. This Note argues that the government’s preliminary burden of
proof remains too low, and that such a standard enables questionable
motives of law enforcement’s seizures of property. This Note also
instituteforjustice/2013/10/30/florida-cops-made-millions-dealing-cocaine-the-latest-assetforfeiture-outrage/ (highlighting that law enforcement in Sunrise, Florida, “conduct ‘reverse’
sting operations, posing as drug dealers to lure buyers with promises of cheap cocaine. Once
the deals go down, cops bust the buyers, and using state and federal forfeiture laws, seize their
cash and cars.”); Joi Elizabeth Peake, Note, Bound By the Sins of Another: Civil Forfeiture
and the Lack of Constitutional Protection for Innocent Owners in Bennis v. Michigan, 75 N.C.
L. REV. 662, 663-64 (1997). Portraying a similar scenario:
In an unfortunate example, Florida officials seized $19,000 from Selena
Washington, a South Carolina Citizen who was carrying cash on her trip to buy
building materials . . . [a]fter stopping Ms. Washington as she traveled down a
Florida Interstate . . . police seized the cash as suspected drug money. The
officer did not take Ms. Washington’s name or give her a receipt; he merely took
the money and sped away. After lengthy negotiations, Ms. Washington settled
with the officials, an alternative cheaper than an extended legal battle; the sheriff
kept $4,000, her attorney got $1,200 and Ms. Washington got back only $13,800.
Id. at 663-64; Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Michael Sallah, They Fought the Law. Who Won?, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 8, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
investigative/2014/09/08/they-fought-the-law-who-won/.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012).
36. See id. (establishing the statutory language set forth by Congress under CAFRA).
37. See Louis S. Rulli, The Long Term Impact of CAFRA: Expanding Access to Counsel
and Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87 (2001).
(“Civil forfeiture practices drew sharp criticism because they did not contain basic safeguards
required in criminal cases, thereby placing ordinary citizens at substantial risk for the loss of
their property without any evidence of criminal wrongdoing”).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 983.
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addresses the fact that the “equitable sharing” program in place under
CAFRA allows for state and local law enforcement officials to bypass
stricter state civil forfeiture laws in favor of easier to fulfill federal
standards which allow for potential profit.39 Section II also discusses the
dangers associated with profits made from civil forfeiture going
undocumented in law enforcement budgets. Finally, it illustrates that the
current system relies heavily on incentives that are directly adverse to
public policy, and which further public mistrust of government officials
when it comes to civil asset forfeiture.40
Section III of this Note suggests how further reform of CAFRA will
serve to legitimize the practice of civil forfeiture. It recommends that
establishing a higher preliminary burden of proof for the government
will provide greater protection for the general public, and ensures that
doing so will result in more legitimate cases being brought to court.
This Note also proposes the elimination of the controversial “equitable
sharing” program so that state and local law enforcement officials would
no longer be able to bypass tougher state laws in favor of federal laws
that provide them with an easier burden.
Finally, Section III
recommends requiring full disclosure of where the funds from civilly
forfeited property are allocated within law enforcement budgets. Doing
so will eliminate the practice of “policing for profit[,]”41 and will abolish
the incentive-based system that raises questions as to the motives of law
enforcement in such cases.42
I. THE STATE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS: WHY REFORM OF
ESTABLISHED LAWS WAS NECESSARY
Although civil asset forfeiture has long been a staple practice within
this country,43 until recently it has not garnered enough attention to
generate concern from the general public. Just prior to Congress’s

39. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) (2012).
40. See Dick M. Carpenter II, Larry Salzman & Lisa Knepper, Inequitable Justice: How
Federal “Equitable Sharing” Encourages Local Police and Prosecutors to Evade State Civil
Forfeiture Law for Financial Gain, INST. FOR JUST. (Oct. 2011), http://www.ij.org/images/
pdf_folder/private_property/forfeiture/ inequitable_justice-mass-forfeiture.pdf.
41. See Marian R. Williams, Jefferson E. Holcomb, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Scott
Bullock, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. 7 (Mar.
2010), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf
(establishing that “policing for profit” occurs, “when state laws make forfeiture more difficult
and less rewarding, [therefore] law enforcement instead takes advantage of easier and more
generous federal forfeiture laws.”).
42. See infra Section III.
43. See generally Michele M. Jochner, The Supreme Court Turns Back the Clock on
Civil Forfeiture in Bennis, 85 ILL. B. J. 314 (2002).
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adoption of CAFRA,44 there came public cries for a change in the type of
assets that could be subjected to this practice.45 However, CAFRA has
not done enough to quell the concern over the state of civil asset
forfeiture law in this country, as many have voiced worry as to whether
the Act goes far enough to protect innocent property owners.46
This section of the Note traces the history of civil asset forfeiture
within the United States and establishes what led to Congress adopting
more defined standards under CAFRA.47 Part I.A, of this Note, provides
a broad overview of how civil asset forfeiture works, and how law
enforcement agencies are able to confiscate property through the
practice. Part I.B highlights the earliest evidence of the exercise of civil
asset forfeiture in this country and traces the practice to its roots in
British jurisprudence. Part I.C works to analyze the state of modern civil
asset forfeiture law prior to CAFRA reform and outlines the many issues
that made reform necessary in the first place. Part I.D establishes the
legislative history leading to the proposal for civil asset forfeiture reform
and highlights the concessions that both the House of Representatives
and the Senate made in order to pass the Act. Additionally, Part I.D
focuses on the initial reaction to CAFRA reform and illustrates that it is
possible that CAFRA, while a step in the right direction, did not do
enough to respond to concerns over potential abuses of the practice.
A. Broad Overview of a Civil Asset Forfeiture Proceeding
There are two routes that may be taken to effectuate the seizure of
property through a forfeiture action: an in rem proceeding or an in
personam proceeding.48 Any crime can trigger a forfeiture action.49 In
44. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012).
45. See The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow at the
Cato Institute), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/ congressional-testimony/civilasset-forfeiture-reform-act-0 (“About the only people who defend forfeiture law today are
those in law enforcement who benefit from it, either as a ‘tool of their trade’ or, more directly,
by keeping the goods they seize—a conflict of interest so stark that it takes us to another age.
In fact, that is just the problem with modern forfeiture law: in practice as well as in theory, its
roots are in notions that have no place whatever in our legal system, animistic and
authoritarian notions that countless people have died over the ages to bury and replace with
the rule of law.”).
46. Id.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 983.
48. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22005, CRIME AND FORFEITURE
(2013) at 2 (establishing that modern forfeiture can take place in one of two ways: an in rem
proceeding which establishes the offending property as the defendant or an in personam
proceeding in which forfeiture occurs on conviction of the property owner).
49. Id. at 3 (“Virtually every kind of property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
may be subject to confiscation under the appropriate circumstances.”).
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each particular incident, the character of the offense that prompted the
forfeiture will determine whether the property or property owner will
face civil or criminal forfeiture.50 In an in rem civil forfeiture
proceeding, the property is “treated as the offender” and becomes the
defendant in the case.51 In fact, in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding,
the fact that property in question was involved in a crime, which calls for
forfeiture, is enough to subject it to a forfeiture proceeding.52 On the
other hand, in the case of a criminal forfeiture, the property in question
may only be surrendered upon a conviction of the property owner on a
charge relating to the confiscation of the property.53
With civil asset forfeiture, as the action is brought against the
property itself and the property owner need not be convicted of a crime
to have his or her property seized; the proceeding is not subjected to the
more challenging criminal procedure standard.54 When the property is
seized through civil forfeiture,
[s]worn statements (affidavits) concerning the circumstances of the
seizure are typically prepared by government employees, such as
police officers or FBI agents. These statements (explaining, for
example, the legal basis for an initial vehicle stop and what the
officer observed such as the smell of burning marijuana) are
presented to courts to link the property in question to the underlying
criminal behavior, thus allowing forfeiture. Forfeiture challenges are
costly and time consuming. Some travelers have reported threats of
unjustified or highly suspect criminal charges and other actions
55
unless they surrendered property on the spot with a signed waiver.

When assets are seized through civil forfeiture, the burden of proof
is on the property owner to prove that the property has no connection to
illegal activity or that the owner was unaware that the property was tied
to the activity in question.56 Also, there are a number of procedural
deadlines that a property owner faces in an attempt to retain his or her
property under current civil asset forfeiture laws,57 which could
potentially lead to the property owner forfeiting the seized assets by

50. Id. at 5.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 6.
54. Brad Reid, An Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Recent Cases, HUFF. POST
(Aug. 14, 2013, 7:03 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-reid/civil-asset-forfeiturech_b_3745209.html.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012).
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B. The Origin of Civil Asset Forfeiture in the United States
Today’s version of asset forfeiture law can be linked directly to its
foundations in the laws of early England.59 It stems from “three early
English procedures: deodands, forfeiture of estate or common law
forfeiture, and statutory or commercial forfeiture.”60 Under English law,
“a chattel (be it an animal or inanimate object) was deemed to be a
deodand whenever a coroner’s jury decided that it had caused the death
of a human being. [And also established that] [d]eodands were
automatically forfeit[ed] to the crown.”61 History suggests that though
the colonists in the American colonies were not subjected to the deodand
rules, these rules had a significant impact on influencing the distinct
qualities of modern civil asset forfeiture laws.62
The second of the English procedures that influenced the American
practice, forfeiture of estate or common law forfeiture, focused less on
the property in question.63 Instead, English procedure concentrated on
the property owner as the offender, stating “[a]t common law, anyone
convicted and attained for treason or a felony forfeited all his lands and
personal property.”64 The final procedure of early English common law
that had an impact on modern day civil asset forfeiture was statutory or
commercial forfeiture, which was used extensively in the American
colonies and again pegged the property in question as the offending
party instead of the property’s owner.65
History establishes that even at that time, colonists did not agree
with the practice of statutory or commercial forfeiture, suggesting that,
“American colonists, particularly business owners, objected to general
‘writs of assistance’ issued by British authorities that allowed broad
searches and the subsequent seizures of discovered property suspected of
58. Reid, supra note 54.
59. DOYLE, supra note 48, at 1.
60. Id.; see The Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes the term deodand as “a thing
that by English law before 1846 was forfeited to the crown and thence to pious uses because it
had been the immediate cause of death of a person.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deodand; see also DOYLE, supra
note 48, at 1 (establishing, “[a]t early common law, the object that caused the death of a
human being—the ox that gored, the knife that stabbed, or the cart that crushed—was
confiscated as a deodand.”).
61. Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. no. 3, 237, 237 (2005).
62. DOYLE, supra note 48, at 1.
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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being associated with smuggling or other crimes.”66
However,
regardless of the colonists’ displeasure for the procedure, this type of
asset forfeiture in connection with crimes had a tremendous impact on
modern asset forfeiture laws.
Civil asset forfeiture has a long history within this country, but the
practice played an insignificant role in the United States’ justice system
until the early 1970s.67 With the passage of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,68 the United States embraced
statutory forfeiture and revived these types of common law
proceedings.69
C. Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture Law Prior to the Introduction of
CAFRA
Civil asset forfeiture was brought to the forefront due, in part, to the
nation’s sweeping interest in the “War on Drugs.”70 Such forfeitures
were made possible under § 881(a) of the Comprehensive Drug Control
Act of 1970.71 The earliest version of the statute was narrow, and
“provided for the forfeiture of conveyances only; it did not permit the
forfeiture of money, negotiable securities, or real property.”72 However,
as the years progressed, a number of amendments to the original statute
served to help the law become a much more powerful tool for law
enforcement officials.73 The revision significantly increased the amount
of property subject to forfeiture under § 881(a), including:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment
66. Reid, supra note 54.
67. Alice Marie O’Brien, Caught in the Crossfire: Protecting the Innocent Owner of
Real Property from Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. S 881(A)(7), 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521,
524-25 (1991).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012).
69. See Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility- The Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L.
REV. 1045, 1048 (2002) (citing U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, n. 7 (1998) (establishing
that, with the passing of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
“Congress resurrected the English common law of punitive forfeiture to combat organized
crime and major drug trafficking. . . . the Senate Judiciary Committee admitted that the revival
of these common law proceedings ‘represents an innovative attempt to call on our common
law heritage to meet an essentially modern problem.’”)).
70. Id.; see also, for a brief history into the coining of the term “War on Drugs,” A Brief
History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE (2014), http://www.drugpolicy.org/newsolutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
71. Johnson, supra note 69. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881.
72. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1049 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1970)).
73. Id.
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of property.
....
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of
this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and
any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more
74
than one year’s imprisonment.

With these revisions came increased criticism over the state of the
civil asset forfeiture laws.75 Specifically, the statute drew criticism over
the lack of a notice requirement, the lack of Constitutional protection for
innocent owners, and the low preliminary burden of proof on the
government required for the initial seizure of the property.76
The inclusion of § 881(a)(7) in the revision of the statute drew
major opposition,77 because under this section all real property could be
seized without prior notice if law enforcement deemed that it had been
used or it had intended to be used in the facilitation of a crime.78 The
Supreme Court did not address this issue until 1993, in United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, when the Court ruled,
that the seizure of real property under § 881(a)(7) is not one of those
extraordinary instances that justify the postponement of notice and
hearing. Unless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process
Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil
79
forfeiture.

However, the Court’s ruling in Good, that notice is required for the
seizure of property, is not as broadly interpreted and applied as it may
seem.80 Consequently, under the revised Controlled Substances Act,81
74. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (emphasis added).
75. Johnson, supra note 69 at 1052.
76. Id. at 1054-55; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453-54 (Thomas,
concurring) (1996).
77. Johnson, supra note 69 at 1057-58.
78. 21 U.S.C. § 881.
79. 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993).
80. Id.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 881.
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property was still regularly seized by law enforcement officials with no
notice whatsoever.82
Additional criticism of the Act stemmed from the lack of protection
given to innocent owners who were unaware of, or could not reasonably
foresee, any criminal activity that their property may be involved in.83
Such owners, however, could still have their property forfeited based on
the conduct of a third party.84 Initially, it seemed as though § 881(a) of
the Controlled Substances Act would provide greater protection to the
innocent property owner, as there has been an innocent owner provision
included in the Act since its implementation.85 Moreover, the Supreme
Court alluded to this protection as a constitutional mandate in CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.86 The Court stated that it would be
tough to refuse a constitutional claim when,
[a]n owner . . . proved not only that he was uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude
that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly
87
oppressive.

Many interpreted the Supreme Court ruling as establishing that the
Constitution mandated such an “innocent owner” defense when all
elements for the status of “innocent owner” were met.88
The idea that that the innocent owner defense was mandated by the
Constitution prevailed until 1996, when the Court, in Bennis v.
Michigan, ruled that the innocent owner defense was not required by the
Constitution.89 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
82. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1052.
83. Id. at 1054.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); see also
Johnson, supra note 69, at 1054 (“In Calero-Toledo, the Puerto Rican government initiated
forfeiture proceedings against a $19,800 rental yacht following the discovery of one marijuana
cigarette that belonged to the individual renting the yacht. The Court upheld the forfeiture
even though all parties conceded the owner ‘had no knowledge that its property was being
used in connection with or in violation of (Puerto Rican Law).’”) (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 668).
87. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90.
88. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1054.
89. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996). For the facts of the case see Peake, supra
note 34, at 666 (establishing that, “Michigan officials sought the forfeiture of an automobile
after it was used in prostitution in violation of Michigan’s indecency statutes. John Bennis
was arrested after police saw him engaging in sexual activity with a prostitute in a parked car.
The car was owned jointly by John Bennis and his wife, Tina Bennis. Tina Bennis entrusted
the car to her husband for transportation to and from work, but did not know that he would use
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established that forfeiture laws, without the inclusion of an innocent
owner defense, were not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause,90 nor were they in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.91 Chief Justice Rehnquist “grounded the
decision on the historical legal fiction that ‘the thing is here primarily
considered as the offender’. . . . The majority reasoned that the failure to
protect innocent owners was justified by the important governmental
interest in deterring illegal activity.”92 Thus, the ruling in Bennis
seemingly became the cause of greater confusion as to what types of
property could or could not be protected under the innocent owner
defense, and many still saw room for abuse of the statute under the
Court’s decision.93
The final pre-forfeiture reform problem that impacted the state of
civil asset forfeiture law concerns the preliminary burden of proof that
the government had to meet in order to seize the property.94 Prior to
CAFRA, under the Controlled Substances Act, “all property was deemed
forfeit[ed] once the government showed probable cause that that
property was used to facilitate a narcotics crime or was derived from a
narcotics crime.”95 With such a low preliminary burden of proof upon
the government96 the potential for abuse of the statute soared.97
it to violate the indecency laws. After John Bennis’ conviction for gross indecency, the State
of Michigan sued to have the car abated as a public nuisance, calling for forfeiture of the car
to the state.”).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Peake, supra note 34 at 667; Fifth Amendment: An
Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amendment
(describing the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as “[w]hile the federal government has a
constitutional right to ‘take’ private property for public use, the Fifth Amendment’s Just
Compensation Clause requires the government to pay just compensation, interpreted as market
value, to the owner of the property.”).
92. Peake, supra note 34, at 667-68 (quoting Bennis, 516 U.S. at 447).
93. See id. at 668-69 (Bennis, 516 U.S. at 456 (Thomas, J., concurring) (highlighting
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion which stated, “[i]mproperly used, forfeiture could
become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless
owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who
associate with criminals, than a component of a system of justice.”)). But see Bennis, 516 U.S.
at 458 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stephens saw the need for a wide-ranging innocent
owner defense, stating that “[t]he logic of the Court’s analysis would permit the States to
exercise virtually unbridled power to confiscate vast amounts of property where professional
criminals have engaged in illegal acts.”).
94. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1058.
95. Id. (emphasis added); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012).
96. An anonymous tip was generally held to be enough to constitute probable cause. See
H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 16 n. 67 (1999).
97. See Johnson, supra note 69 at 1058-59 (exemplifying the potential for abuse under
such a low burden, “[f]or example, in Boston, thirteen members of the S.W.A.T. team raided
Rev. Accelynne Williams’ apartment searching for drugs and guns, but found none. Rev.
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Once the government has met the burden of probable cause, the
burden then shifts to the property owner to establish that his or her
property is not subject to forfeiture, which is a much more challenging
standard to meet.98 By default, it is simply more difficult to prove that
something did not happen or that property was not involved in a crime
than to meet the preliminary probable cause burden.99 The ever-growing
concern over the preliminary burden of proof placed upon the
government was an important part of the call for asset forfeiture reform,
and such concerns were addressed in the earliest versions of reform
proposals.100
D. The Introduction of Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
As early as the first part of the 1990s, it became clear that federal
civil asset forfeiture laws were primed and ready for large-scale
reform.101 Though former President Bill Clinton did not sign the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 into law until April 25, 2000, early
versions of the Act were first introduced well before then.102
Representatives Henry Hyde, a Republican, and John Conyers, a
Democrat, were the first to initiate civil asset forfeiture reform.
Representative Hyde was concerned with the fact that very little had
been done to protect innocent property owners and stated, “startling
abuses of fundamental fairness [have not] ceased to occur.”103 Further,
Representative Hyde expressed apprehension over the fact that abuse of
civil asset forfeiture laws has a negative impact on public policy, and
does not serve to further the objectives of policy decisions of the

Williams, who was seventy-five years old, died of a heart attack after being ‘secured’ on the
floor by three police officers. As it turned out, the confidential informant who provided the
probable cause had been drunk the night he visited a drug den and was mistaken about the
identity and location of the malefactors. The police, of course, not being required to meet a
higher standard of proof than probable cause, did not investigate further.”); see also Sara
Rimer, Minister Who Sought Peace Dies in a Botched Drug Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/28/us/minister-who-sought-peace-dies-in-a-botched-drugraid.html.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012).
99. See Johnson, supra note 69, at 1059 (noting that, “[i]t is much easier for the
government to prove that such an event might (the statute only required probable cause) have
happened than for the owner to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that this chain of
events never happened.”).
100. Id.
101. Kessler, supra note 4.
102. See id.
103. Henry Hyde, Statement of Rep Henry Hyde, “Forfeiture Reform: Now, or
Never?”, ACLU (May 3, 1999), https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/statement-rephenry-hyde-forfeiture-reform-now-or-never.
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government.104
Additionally, Representative Conyers was further
concerned with the ability of police forces to funnel forfeited funds into
their budgets.105
In the early drafts of the proposal, the Representatives wanted to
impose strict regulations on law enforcement officials in potential asset
forfeiture situations.106 Representatives Hyde and Conyers initially
called for a “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden on the
government,107 which would mark a stark increase in the evidentiary
requirement from the original “probable cause” burden under the then
current standards.108 The Representatives were concerned with the fact
that under the forfeiture laws at the time, the government was required to
prove almost nothing, while the higher burden landed squarely on the
property owner who opposes and must defend against the forfeiture of
his or her property.109
It soon became clear, however, that the Senate was not willing to
pass a bill that called for the government to meet a “clear and
convincing” preliminary burden of proof.110
Shortly thereafter,
Representatives Hyde and Conyers settled upon the “preponderance of
the evidence” evidentiary burden, which was more stringent than
previous asset forfeiture law requirements, but not quite as strict as a
“clear and convincing” burden would have required.111
With the bill, the Representatives also sought to tackle other
controversial aspects of civil asset forfeiture laws that were in effect.112
104. Id.
105. Cornell University Law School, Forfeiture, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forfeiture.
106. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 3, 114 STAT.
202, 212 (2000).
107. Cornell University Law School, Clear and Convincing Evidence, LEGAL INFO.
INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_evidence (defining “clear and
convincing” as, “a medium level of burden of proof . . . . In order to meet the standard and
prove something by clear and convincing evidence, a party must prove that it is substantially
more likely than not that it is true.”).
108. Cornell University Law School, Probable Cause, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (establishing that courts, “usually find
probable cause when there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime may have been
committed (for arrest) and that evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched (for
search).”); Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act § 5, 114 STAT. at 213.
109. See Hyde, supra note 103 (stating that, “[i]n civil forfeiture cases, where claimants
are required to go forward with evidence and exculpate their property by a preponderance of
the evidence, all risks are squarely on the claimant. The government, under the current
approach, need not produce any admissible evidence and may deprive citizens of property
based on the rankest of hearsay and the flimsiest evidence.”).
110. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 12.
111. Id.
112. Hyde, supra note 103.
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Another of their proposals was to provide a blanket innocent owner
defense for all property owners involved in federal civil asset forfeiture
situations.113 Representative Hyde stated,
An innocent owner defense is required by fundamental fairness. My
bill provides that an innocent owner’s interest in property shall not
be forfeited in any civil forfeiture action. An owner would be
considered innocent if he did not know of the conduct giving rise to
the forfeiture or upon learning of such conduct, did all that
reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate
such use. An owner is considered to have taken all the steps that a
reasonable person would take if the owner, to the extent permitted by
law (1) gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement agency
of information that led the owner to know that the conduct giving
rise to forfeiture would occur or has occurred, and (2) in a timely
fashion, revoked or attempted to revoke permission for those
engaging in such conduct to use the property or took reasonable steps
in consultation with a law enforcement agency to discourage or
114
prevent the illegal use.

The innocent owner defense, which Representative Hyde believed
would go a long way in the protection of innocent property owners, was
accepted.115 Subsequently, CAFRA contains a specific innocent owner
provision: noting that property owners who have undertaken reasonable
precautions in the prevention of illegal activities cannot be subject to
asset forfeiture under the Reform Act.116
While Congress billed CAFRA as a widespread solution to limiting
past abuses of civil forfeiture laws, it has been far from limiting.117
Instead of the extensive reform that Representatives Hyde and Conyers
sought to accomplish with the bill, the Act took the shape of a much
more restricted reform.118 In reality, it addressed only specific issues in
areas of the law that were frequently encountered by both the
government in prosecuting the case and the defense in representing the
property owners.119
Issues stemming from this restricted reform are largely prevalent
and it is generally believed that, “to return forfeiture to its pure and
proper form, where the motivation underlying the process is not one of
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012). Kessler, supra note 4.
116. Civil Asset Forfeiture, CCIM INST. (July 2006), http://www.ccim.com/sites/
default/files/ccim-briefing-paper_civil-asset-forfeiture.pdf.
117. Kessler, supra note 4.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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greed and fund-raising, requires revision of the system itself, an agenda
left unaddressed by the tweakings to the statutes made by the Reform
Act.”120 While seemingly providing greater protection to property
owners than civil asset forfeiture laws had previously, the Act itself does
little to hinder law enforcement’s ability to seize property that may have
been used in the facilitation of a crime.121
II. THE ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN FROM THE CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE REFORM ACT OF 2000
The following two sections of this Note address issues that citizens
face under the current standards set forth in CAFRA and propose further
reform that the government should implement to avoid continued abuse
of civil asset forfeiture statutes. This section of the Note argues that the
current standards under CAFRA are not as limiting on law
enforcement’s ability to seize property, which may have been involved
in a crime, as Congress intended when changing the civil asset forfeiture
reform laws.122 As evidenced by the district court’s decision in United
States v. 434 Main Street, innocent property owners continue to face a
nearly insurmountable burden in order to retain the rights to their seized
property.123 The current practices of federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies undermine the intentions of CAFRA sponsors in
proposing the Act.124 Such practices hinder the ability of state
governments to establish stricter standards of their own, which would
provide greater protection for property owners, under state laws, against
civil asset forfeiture.125 The conflict between state and federal civil asset
forfeiture laws has arisen because of the ability of state and local law
enforcement officials to bypass stricter state laws in order to reap the

120. Id.
121. See id. (“For the moment, as with any compromise, the Act leaves both sides
somewhat dissatisfied. Prosecutors and police organizations, reaping the benefits of the law
prior to this Act, adopted the adage ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,’ while the defense bar often
felt it was conceding too much for little in return. In the end, the Act appears to carry through
a large part of the reform agenda without limiting law enforcement’s use of forfeiture as an
effective tool against crime.”).
122. See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012); see also United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp.
2d 298, 318 (D. Mass. 2013) (citations omitted) (“CAFRA ‘heightens the government’s
evidentiary burden in civil forfeitures.’ Previously, the government only had to demonstrate
probable cause that a property was subject to forfeiture, at which time the burden shifted to the
claimant ‘to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was not subject
to forfeiture.’ The government’s burden of showing probable cause was ‘a relatively light
burden.’”).
123. United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
124. Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40, at 13.
125. Id.

LEVESQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

76

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

4/13/15 4:01 PM

[Vol. 37: 59

benefits of the more easily attained federal standard under CAFRA.126
Part II.A of this Note reviews the preliminary burden of proof on
the government required to seize property under CAFRA and highlights
the potential for abuse of the statute by federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials under this current standard. Part II.B scrutinizes
the “equitable sharing” program established under CAFRA and explores
how state and local authorities are able to bypass tougher state and local
laws to implement the more revenue friendly federal program. Part II.C
establishes the negative impact the Act has on public policy and
illustrates that CAFRA is an incentive-based system that encourages law
enforcement to seize innocent property for the benefit of federal, state
and local budgets.127 Part II.D details the practice of allowing CAFRAseized funds to go undocumented in law enforcement budgets and the
widespread negative impact of this type of system.
A. Government’s Preliminary Burden of “Preponderance of the
Evidence” Allows for Seizure of Assets with Little to No Connection
to a Crime
With the implementation of CAFRA, the Senate and the House of
Representatives compromised on the initial burden of proof required for
law enforcement to seize the property in question.128 The relevant
language of the statute reads:
(c) Burden of proof.—In a suit or action brought under any civil
forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property—
(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to
forfeiture; (2) the Government may use evidence gathered after the
filing of a complaint for forfeiture to establish, by a preponderance
129
of the evidence, that property is subject to forfeiture. . . .

126. Id.
127. The term “innocent” property refers to the long held legal fiction, used in civil
asset forfeiture proceedings, “that the property itself is the defendant in the case—and not the
owner. Because the property is ‘guilty’, the fiction goes, it can be forfeited without respect to
the rights of its owner(s), because property, not being a person, has no constitutional rights.”
See Brenda Grantland, The Department of “Justice” and Other Legal Fictions, 1 F.E.A.R.
CHRONICLES 3 (Aug. 1992) available at http://www.fear.org/chron/editoria1_3.txt.
128. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 3, 114
STAT. 202, 212 (2000) (the proposed House of Representatives bill called for a preliminary
“clear and convincing” burden on the government); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 11 n.
47 (revised report that established the “preponderance of the evidence” standard once it was
clear that the House of Representatives and the Senate were not going to come to an
agreement on a “clear and convincing” standard of proof).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012) (emphasis added).
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After satisfying the preliminary burden that the disputed property is
“more likely than not” connected to drug activity, the property is subject
to forfeiture and the burden subsequently shifts to the property owner to
disprove the accusations.130 Raising the preliminary burden on the
government from the pre-CAFRA “probable cause” standard to the postCAFRA “preponderance of the evidence” standard was supposed to
ensure that law enforcement officials would be required to make a more
substantial connection between the property and the suspected crime.131
In reality, this change has done little to provide greater protection to
property owners.132
In early 2013, the federal government seized the entire bank
account of a family-run grocery store in Michigan without giving
warning to the owners because the government alleged that the owners
had been structuring their deposits to avoid tax liability.133 However,
only nine months prior, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) conducted
an investigation into the grocery store and cleared the owners of any
wrongdoing.134 The IRS established that the family frequently made
smaller deposits not to avoid tax liability, but because they held a typical
small business insurance policy that significantly limited their insurance
coverage if a theft were to occur.135
Although the owners were cleared of any wrongdoing and were
never charged with a crime in connection with any government
investigation, the preliminary burden of proof on the government, that it
was more likely than not that the money in the bank account seized by
the government was attained through the facilitation of a crime, was
met.136 In the ongoing litigation, the owners of the grocery store now
bear the burden of proving, at their own expense, that the money was not
used in the facilitation of a crime.137
With the increase of the preliminary burden to a “preponderance of
130. See Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 30, at 4 (“[W]ith civil forfeiture,
property owners are effectively guilty until proven innocent. The increased burden (including
substantial legal costs) of proving one’s innocence can result in owners abandoning rightful
claims to seized property. And if owners do not fight civil forfeiture and the government wins
by default, law enforcement agencies are more likely to engage in it.”).
131. Randy Balko, Forfeiture Folly: Cover Your Assets, REASON (Apr. 2008), available
at http://reason.com/archives/2008/03/07/forfeiture-folly.
132. Id.
133. Michigan Forfeiture Victims To Get Their Day in Court: IRS Must Produce
Witnesses to Explain Forfeiture Practices, INST. FOR JUST. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://ij.org/
michigan-civil-forfeiture-release-11-08-2013.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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the evidence” standard under CAFRA, it was widely assumed that the
heightened burden would result in fewer seizures.138 However, that has
not been the case, as “courts have been steadily mitigating the 2000
bill’s impact, both by narrowly interpreting the protections it grants
defendants and by being overly deferential to prosecutors when
determining if they’ve met the new evidentiary standard.”139 Allowing
seizures in such cases where the court has been deferential in
determining if the preponderance standard has been met sets forth a
slippery slope for the future of civil asset forfeiture cases.
Permitting cases to go forward under the current CAFRA
evidentiary burden only serves to benefit the government in its seizure of
goods, and inexcusably shifts a higher burden to property owners.140
Requiring such a low preliminary burden of proof, even though it was
seemingly increased under CAFRA, will further serve to burden
innocent property owners.141
If such a minimal burden of proof remains, a continued potential for
abuse will exist. In recent years the revenue generated through civil
asset forfeiture in this country has grown exponentially.142 Considering
how the preponderance standard has been interpreted post-CAFRA, law
enforcement officials may have the ability to create faulty scenarios in
order to seize property that they know to be innocent.143
Such schemes may be made possible simply by allowing law
enforcement to meet the low burden of proof that it is more likely than
not that the property in question is connected to a crime.144 Eighty
percent of all forfeitures go uncontested.145 As officials are aware that
many forfeitures are uncontested, they can reasonably assume that the
property they seize will not be sought after in court.146 The cost of
138. Balko, supra note 131.
139. Id.
140. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 6-7 (“In 2008, for the first time in history, the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) held more than $1 billion in net assets— that is, money forfeited
from property owners and now available for federal law enforcement activities after deducting
various expenses. A similar fund at the U.S. Treasury Department held more than $400
million in net assets in 2008. By contrast, in 1986, the year after the AFF was created, it took
in just $93.7 million in deposits.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (Note that eighty percent of all forfeitures go uncontested by property owners
not because the property owners do not have legitimate cases to retain their property. Instead,
such a large amount of forfeitures go uncontested because the cost (in time, effort, and money)
to defend against a seizure is high and oftentimes the effort to retain the property may end up
costing the wronged property owner more than the property itself is worth).
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litigation is often too much for the property owners to fight the
seizure.147 In such situations, it is likely that law enforcement officials
would be willing to take their chances in the seizing of the property, in
the hopes of obtaining the revenue gained through the seizure.
B. The “Equitable Sharing” Program Assists State and Local Law
Enforcement in Bypassing Tougher State Civil Forfeiture Laws
With CAFRA, the federal government established the federal civil
asset forfeiture preliminary burden of proof as a “preponderance of the
evidence” standard.148 However, states have retained the right to
establish their own standards through the police powers granted under
the Constitution.149 Nevertheless, through the federal government’s
questionable “equitable sharing” program, state and local law
enforcement have the ability to bypass state law that is less favorable to
their intentions. Therefore, state and local officials have the ability to
satisfy the preponderance standard of proof if their state requires a
stricter preliminary burden such as a “clear and convincing” or a
“beyond reasonable doubt” standard.150
The “equitable sharing” program was first introduced under the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.151 The program enables
state and local law enforcement agencies to seize property that may not

147. Id.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40; see
also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 47 (2014) (However, there are states that have a preliminary
standard of proof even lower than the federal standard set forth in CAFRA. The
Massachusetts civil forfeiture statute requires, “the commonwealth shall have the burden of
proving to the court the existence of probable cause to institute the action, and any such
claimant shall then have the burden of proving that the property is not forfeitable.”).
150. See Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40, at 1 (“[W]ith equitable
sharing, state and local law enforcement can take and profit from property they might not be
able to under state law. If a state provides owners greater protections or bars law enforcement
from directly benefiting from forfeitures, agencies can simply turn to federal law.”); see also
Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41 (“[F]ederal civil forfeiture laws
encourage abuse by providing a loophole to law enforcement in states with good laws for
property owners: ‘equitable sharing.’ With equitable sharing, state law enforcement can turn
over seized assets to the federal government, or they may seize them jointly with federal
officers. The property is then subject to federal civil forfeiture law—not state law.”). See
generally Cornell University Law School defines the “clear and convincing” evidentiary
burden as, “a party must prove that it is substantially more likely than not that it is true,”
LEGAL INFO. INST., available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_
evidence. See generally NOLO’s Plain-English Law Dictionary, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/reasonable-doubt-term.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015)
(defining the beyond reasonable doubt evidentiary burden as, “the prosecutor must prove . . .
guilt ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”).
151. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41.
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meet the preliminary burden to be seized under their own state laws and
subsequently transfer it to federal agencies to apply the federal
preponderance burden.152 In addition, the incentive for state and local
authorities to use the “equitable sharing” program stems from the
financial benefits that may be provided to these law enforcement
officials under the Act.153
State and local authorities may transfer the seized property to
federal officials in the event that “the ‘conduct giving rise to the seizure
is in violation of federal law and where federal law provides for
forfeiture.’”154 In situations where state and local authorities transfer the
seized property to federal authorities, under the federal “equitable
sharing” program, they are entitled to as much as eighty percent of the
profits made from the seized property, even if relevant state law limits or
prohibits profit-based incentives.155
Moreover, the incentive for state and local officials to avoid state
law and apply federal law is great.156 If property is seized through the
“equitable sharing” program, “the federal government requires that any
funds distributed through equitable sharing arrangements be used solely
to fund law enforcement activities, even for agencies in states where law
enforcement receives none of the proceeds from state forfeitures.”157
Additional provisions of the “equitable sharing” program allow for
profits made from seizure of assets through the program to pay for state
and local taskforce officer salaries, even if the laws of the particular state
would prohibit forfeiture profits from funding such a position.158
With such incentives for state and local officials to bypass the
provisions set forth by their own states and enforce the federal “equitable
sharing” provisions, the Constitutional powers of the states are infringed
upon and such a system undermines the power regulated to the states.159
For example,
law enforcement agencies in states where at least a portion of
forfeiture proceeds must be used for non-law enforcement purposes
had significantly higher levels of equitable sharing payments than
agencies where law enforcement could keep the proceeds. The
results suggest that law enforcement agencies in states that require

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26-27.
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law enforcement to share forfeiture proceeds are more likely to
160
engage in equitable sharing in order to avoid state restrictions.

The program encourages both state and local officials to abandon
stricter state policies simply because of financial incentives provided by
the federal system.161 Additionally, it forces agencies to abandon the
idea of protecting innocent property owners and instead encourages them
to become solely revenue-driven entities.
C. Incentive-Based System Encourages Civil Asset Forfeiture and
Hinders Public Policy
Under CAFRA, law enforcement authorities involved in the seizure
of the assets in question are entitled to keep a portion, and in some cases,
all of the proceeds collected through the seizure.162 In fact, “given the
structures and incentives of civil forfeiture law, a substantial number of
law enforcement agencies are now dependent on civil forfeiture proceeds
and view civil forfeiture as a necessary source of income.”163 This
incentive of authorities getting to keep large portions of the funds
generated through the seizure of assets creates concern that the
authorities involved may act in such a way that they are “policing for
profit.”164 Such a practice essentially means that law enforcement
agencies may actively chase forfeitures to pad their budgets at the
expense of more legitimate enforcement behavior.165 This theory hinges
on the idea that because incentives such as increased paychecks, larger
budgets, new equipment, and specialized training, among others, are
threatened without the proper funding, law enforcement officials are not
going to be in a position to go above and beyond their standard duty to

160. Id. at 26-27; see also id. at 7 (“Law enforcement agencies in states with no profit
motive (no forfeiture profits to law enforcement) will receive more in equitable sharing than
agencies in states with a 100-percent profit motive—an increase of $30,000 per year for an
average-sized law enforcement agency, representing an increase of 25 percent of equitable
sharing dollars.”).
161. See Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2009), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ri/projects/esguidelines.pdf (last
visited Sept. 21, 2014).
162. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 6.
163. Id. at 12; see also id. (“[According] to a survey of nearly 800 law enforcement
executives. . . nearly 40 percent of police agencies reported that civil forfeiture proceeds were
a necessary budget supplement. . . . [T]his dependency is also present at the federal level,
where the Department of Justice in the past has urged its lawyers to increase their civil
forfeiture efforts so as to meet the Department’s annual budget targets.”).
164. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41.
165. Id.
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protect the best interests of the public at large.166
Instead, officials are incentivized to seize the opportunity to acquire
some additional funds, and when it arises, they can confiscate any and all
potentially forfeitable assets, largely at the expense of proper justice.167
This theory alone identifies a significant public policy issue through the
use of civil forfeiture. The use of such laws creates tension between the
objectives of law enforcement officials and the public that they are
sworn to protect. When law enforcement officials are dependent on civil
asset forfeiture funds, it undermines the very foundation upon which
they serve. Their mission is protecting the rights of the public, and their
duty as public service officers is significantly hindered by such profitdriven motives.168
The incentive-based system of “policing for profit” under current
civil asset forfeiture laws has grown exponentially in recent years,
largely due in part to the economic crisis in this country.169 As federal,
state, and local law enforcement budgets get tighter and more precarious
due to a lack of funding,170 it is only natural that these agencies turn to
other programs to try to raise revenue.
The idea that such agencies have turned to civil asset forfeiture as a
means of raising revenue is exemplified by the fact that, “in 1986, the
second year after the creation of the Department of Justice Assets
Forfeiture Fund, the Fund took in $93.7 million in proceeds from
forfeited assets. By 2008, the Fund for the first time in history topped $1
billion in net assets.”171 As of 2011, the Fund had grown as large as $1.8
billion.172 It is important to note that, “[i]n addition to the fund’s size,
payments from the fund to local law enforcement agencies totalled [sic]
$445 million in 2011, another all-time high.”173 Increased dependence

166. Scott Bullock & Vanita Gupta, End Policing for Profit, HUFF.POST, (June 12,
2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-bullock/end-policing-forprofit_b_534553.html.
167. Id.
168. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41.
169. See id. at 12 (“The difference between self-interest in the public and private
spheres is that the private citizen must persuade to achieve his ends, while the government
official can employ force. It is therefore a constant threat that those in positions of power will
use that force to serve their own self-interest at the expense of the broader populace. This
concern reaches its zenith when government officials stand to aggrandize themselves by
seizing individuals’ private property for their own benefit.”).
170. Id. at 11.
171. Id.
172. Mike Riggs, Federal Asset Forfeiture Continues to Skyrocket Under Obama,
REASON (July 31, 2012), http://reason.com/blog/2012/07/31/federal-asset-forfeitureskyrockets-unde.
173. Id.
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on such funds only further serves to guarantee federal, state, and local
law enforcement abuse of CAFRA requirements, which largely hinders
the public policy incentive of such agencies to provide a protective
service to the general public.174
D. Funds Seized Through CAFRA Go Largely Undocumented in Law
Enforcement Budgets
Another troubling aspect of civil asset forfeiture arises once the
government has seized the property in question. The federal, state, and
local law enforcement authorities involved in the seizure under CAFRA
are entitled to some, if not all, of the profits that stem from the seized
property.175 Even more troubling, however, is that once the profit is
obtained, state and local law enforcement officials are largely not
required to report how the money was obtained, to which parts of the
budget the profit was allocated, or how the funds were spent by the
department.176 It is difficult to determine where the money comes from
and where it goes in such budgets because as it stands, there are only
twenty-nine states that require such information on civil asset forfeiture
funds be documented.177 Of the data that has been collected, however, it
is clear that federal, state, and local law enforcement officials use profits
collected through asset forfeiture extensively.178
With very little regulation as to how federal, state, and local
forfeiture assets are spent; law enforcement agencies are afforded the
opportunity to use these funds in any manner that they deem to be
necessary.179 For example, a 2007 audit of a Georgian district attorney’s
office highlighted a number of potential abuses of allowing agencies
seemingly free reign:
According to auditor’s reports, almost one-third of the 376 checks
written out of the asset forfeiture account in 2006 were either
174. See Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 18, 20 (“An
example of how law enforcement maintains its ‘addiction’ to forfeiture funds is the practice of
‘reverse stings,’ in which police pose as drug sellers rather than buyers. Forfeiture advocates’
claims of ‘preventing crime and putting major offenders away’ are inconsistent with [such
practices]. . . . Instead, law enforcement targets buyers rather than sellers because buyers tend
to have more cash on hand subject to forfeiture.”) (footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 9.
176. Id. at 8, 13 (“Public accountability over civil asset forfeiture in the states is
extremely limited. Only 29 states clearly require law enforcement to collect and report
forfeiture data, and just 19 of those states responded to freedom-of-information requests with
usable data—and the data provided were often meager. In most states, we know nothing or
next-to-nothing about the use of civil forfeiture or its proceeds.”).
177. Id. at 27.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 13.
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questionable or not allowed under federal guidelines. Those
questionable expenses totaled more than $2 million. Under federal
asset forfeiture laws, money seized by the feds and handed over to
state law enforcement may only be used for law enforcement
purposes. But [the] [d]istrict [a]ttorney . . . has a very expansive
view of just what that means. . . . [The] asset forfeiture fund
spending included: . . . $5,150 for benefits, dinners, football tickets,
fundraisers, and balls sponsored by various civic organizations –
none of them directly related to law enforcement; $5,500 spent on
rent and catering for a staff Christmas party; $89 for a Supermanstyle red cape with “Super Lawyer” printed on it that an assistant
prosecutor was encouraged to wear at the Christmas party; $150 for a
dinner party to celebrate the conviction of a murderer; and $9,100 for
Howard’s perfect attendance program for students in Atlanta’s public
180
elementary schools.

Furthermore, the district attorney justified the questionable
spending of the asset forfeiture funds by arguing that they were effective
crime fighting expenditures that benefited the purposes of law
enforcement and provided an increase in office morale, stating, “[w]e
cannot pay our employees bonuses. We can’t pay overtime. . . . I tried to
come up with ways to increase morale.”181 The problem that the auditors
had in trying to determine if the spending of the funds was in violation
of federal civil asset forfeiture laws was that it was impossible to
determine exactly where the funds originated.182 There were a number
of federal funds intermingled in one bank account, making it difficult to
determine which of the funds had been spent on each expense.183
By allowing federal, state, and local law enforcement officials
continued opportunities for abuse, as exemplified in Georgia,184
exploitation of civil asset forfeiture will continue to run rampant among
law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, public perception of spending
of forfeiture-seized funds will only grow more negative in the years to
come.185

180. Phillip Smith, Law Enforcement: Asset Forfeiture Funds Spent on Banquets, Balls,
and Balloons in Atlanta, DRUG WAR CHRONICLE (Sept. 14, 2007), http://stopthedrugwar.org/
chronicle/2007/sep/14/law_enforcement_asset_forfeiture.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
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III. REFORMING CAFRA: ENHANCING THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH
BY CAFRA WILL LEGITIMIZE CONGRESS’S INTENTIONS FOR THE ACT
This section of the Note focuses on potential options for CAFRA
reform. Though Congress’s intent in passing the Act was to impose
tougher civil asset forfeiture standards, in practice this has not taken
effect.186 Part III.A asserts the need to raise the government’s
preliminary burden of proof to a “clear and convincing” standard, which
would provide more protection for property owners, as it requires the
government to provide more substantial evidence before seizing any
property in question.
Part III.B explains that requiring a higher preliminary standard of
proof on the government would serve to eliminate the questionable
“equitable sharing program” because state and local authorities would no
longer simply be able to bypass more stringent state laws in favor of a
more forgiving federal law. Part III.C proposes requiring federal, state,
and local authorities to disclose where and how funds collected through
civil asset forfeiture will be distributed and applied.
A. Raising the Government’s Preliminary Burden of Proof Provides
More Protection to the Public
This Section discusses how different states have approached the
preliminary standard of proof required of the state in civil forfeiture
cases.187 Analysis of individual state statutes and practices supports the
assertion that raising the government’s preliminary burden of proof in
federal civil asset forfeiture cases will help to eliminate law
enforcement’s abuse of CAFRA.188 As it stands, North Carolina is the
only state in the country that does not allow for civil forfeiture, allowing
forfeiture only after the owner of a property has been convicted of a
crime.189 Only two states, Wisconsin and Nebraska, require the criminal
burden that the property be connected to the crime “beyond a reasonable
doubt” before the property can be seized.190 However, there are a
number of states that have adopted the “clear and convincing”
186. See Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded
Government Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97
(2001) (discussing the initial intent of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in
their proposed bills prior to the adoption of the Act).
187. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 109 (discussing and
grading the civil asset forfeiture laws for every state, and establishing how they apply their
standard and how effective the state’s statute has been in practice).
188. Id. at 41.
189. Id. at 80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2.3 (2014).
190. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 74, 101; see Wis
Stat.. § 961.555 (2014).
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evidentiary burden, which requires that the government show that it is
“substantially more likely than not” that the property in question was
involved in the facilitation of a crime.191 This evidentiary standard
provides greater protection to the public.192 It requires a more
substantial showing that the property in question has been involved in a
crime and would make it harder for law enforcement officials to seize
property with limited proof.193
The “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden is the standard of
proof originally advocated for by the Representatives introducing civil
asset forfeiture reform.194 They did so because they recognized the
widespread potential for abuse of forfeiture laws if a low preliminary
burden of proof were utilized.195 Since the introduction of the Act, the
abuses of the current standard have only grown more rampant, and
therefore support for an increased “clear and convincing” standard is
likely to be more widespread.
B. Eliminate the Revenue Based “Equitable Sharing Program”
In order for the proposed increase of the preliminary evidentiary
burden to a “clear and convincing” standard of proof to be successful,
the federal government would also have to phase out the controversial
“equitable sharing” program. Because the “equitable sharing” program
encourages state and local officials to circumvent their state’s own laws
in favor of seizure of the property under federal regulations, increasing
the federal burden of proof under CAFRA would be ineffective unless
the “equitable sharing” program is eliminated.196 Under the program,
state and local officials have the ability to work with federal officials to
seize property under federal law, based solely on the fact that they are
seeking to bypass stricter state laws and attain greater revenue based
incentives.197 Eliminating the program altogether would end such
practices, as there would be no financial incentives to hand over the
seized assets to the federal government.
191. See Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 22 (establishing
that ten states currently place a preliminary “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden on law
enforcement officials before seizure of the property in question). For the definition of “clear
and convincing” see Cornell University Law School, LEGAL INFO. INST., available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_evidence.
192. See Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 22.
193. See “Clear and Convincing Evidence,” supra note 107.
194. Hyde, supra note 103.
195. Id.; see also Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 2,
114 STAT. 202, 205-06 (2000).
196. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 6, 12.
197. Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40, at 1.

LEVESQUE.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/13/15 4:01 PM

WHEN REFORM IS NOT ENOUGH

87

C. Require Full Disclosure as to the Apportionment of Civil Forfeiture
Funds to Help Eliminate Incentive-Based System
As it stands, there is very little regulation as to how civil asset
forfeiture funds are apportioned and accounted for within federal, state,
and local budgets.198 This lack of specific accountability leads to
questions about how much money and other assets are actually acquired
through such practices.199 Mandatory disclosure of the location of such
assets would bring more attention to the fact that civil asset forfeiture
standards have been abused in the recent past and will help to limit such
abuse in the future. Requiring all federal, local, and state agencies to
document, track, and report all profit and how such profit is distributed
amongst agencies is the only way to ensure that abuse of civil asset
forfeiture laws does not continue.200
Some states have already created, or are in the process of
attempting to create, strict regulations about how such funding should be
accounted for, and they also seek to address how any and all profit
should be spent.201 For example, proposed legislation in Massachusetts
attempts to fairly carve out who should be entitled to such gains:
The final order of the court shall provide that said monies and the
proceeds of any such sale shall be distributed in the following
manner: thirty-four percent shall be distributed to the Senator
Charles E. Shannon, Jr. Community Safety Initiative Fund created
pursuant to section 35U of chapter 10 of the general laws, thirtythree percent to the prosecuting district attorney or attorney general,
and thirty-three percent to the city, town, state, or metropolitan
district police department involved in the seizure, provided, however,
that more than one department was substantially involved in the
seizure, the court having jurisdiction of the forfeiture proceeds shall
202
equitably distribute said proceeds among those departments.

By providing explicit instructions as to how civil asset forfeiture
funds should be allocated, and how they should be able to be used by
law enforcement officials, state and federal officials can work to
guarantee that the funds are spent legitimately in the future.
CONCLUSION
Without reform, law enforcement’s abuse under CAFRA will
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 14.
See H.R. 188 No. 1238, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2013).
Id.
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potentially increase exponentially. If such potential is acted upon, a
larger number of innocent property owners will have their property
wrongfully seized. The House of Representatives saw this potential for
abuse when the initial reform was introduced; however, compromise led
to a more lenient standard of proof on the government when it comes to
the initial hurdle that it must overcome to seize the assets in question.203
Under the current version of CAFRA, there are glaring issues that need
to be addressed in order to hinder abuse of the law against the drafter’s
intentions and protect the American public.
The preliminary burden on the government requiring a
“preponderance of the evidence” that the asset in question is subject to
forfeiture is not a high enough standard and encourages law
enforcement’s continued abuse of the intentions of the Act.
Additionally, allowing for an “equitable sharing” program that helps
state and local law enforcement officials circumvent stricter or less
profitable state laws in favor of a more lenient federal law undermines
the rights of the states. Further, it encourages officials to cherry-pick the
course of action that is most beneficial to their revenue based policing
efforts. Allowing for such incentive driven policing violates public
policy. Finally, the practice of permitting revenue that is raised through
civil asset forfeiture to remain undocumented in local, state, and, federal
budgets only further encourages questionable behavior of law
enforcement.
Reform of civil asset forfeiture laws must be undertaken if the
public ever hopes to obtain treatment that is to be considered fair under
the law in regard to such forfeitures. The preliminary burden of proof on
the government needs to be raised from the preponderance standard to a
stricter “clear and convincing” standard. Heightening the preliminary
burden will require law enforcement to produce additional evidence to
prove that the asset in question is subject to forfeiture. It will
additionally serve to protect indigent property owners who do not have
the means to oppose such wrongful seizures, which can occur under such
a low burden of proof.
Additionally, the “equitable sharing” program must be
discontinued. It encourages state and local agencies to circumvent
legitimate state laws in hopes of acquiring more revenue. Such actions
violate the very principles that our law enforcement agencies were
established to promote. Finally, the allocation of civil forfeiture
acquired revenue needs to be documented and made public knowledge.

203. Cassella, supra note 186.
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If law enforcement agencies continue to be given the opportunity to
conceal the revenue that they acquire through civil asset forfeiture in
budgets, salaries, and new equipment the practice of abusing the law will
continue and reform will be largely unsuccessful.
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